Abstract. We explore the relationships between Description Logics and Set Theory. The study is carried on using, on the set-theoretic side, a very rudimentary axiomatic set theory Ω, consisting of only four axioms characterizing binary union, set difference, inclusion, and the power-set. An extension of ALC, ALC Ω , is then defined in which concepts are naturally interpreted as sets living in Ω-models. In ALC Ω not only membership between concepts is allowed-even admitting circularity-but also the power-set construct is exploited to add metamodeling capabilities. We investigate translations of ALC Ω into standard description logics as well as a set-theoretic translation. A polynomial encoding of ALC Ω in ALCOI proves the validity of the finite model property as well as an EXP-TIME upper bound on the complexity of concept satisfiability. We develop a settheoretic translation of ALC Ω in the theory Ω, exploiting a technique proposed for translating normal modal and polymodal logics into Ω. Finally, we show that the fragment LC Ω of ALC Ω , which does not admit roles and individual names, is as expressive as ALC Ω
Introduction
Concept and concept constructors in Description Logics (DLs) allow to manage information built-up and stored as collection of elements of a given domain. In this paper we would like to take the above statement seriously and put forward a DL doubly linked with a (very simple, axiomatic) set theory. Such a logic will be suitable to manipulate concepts (also called classes in OWL [26] ) as first-class citizens, in the sense that it will allow the possibility to have concepts as instances (a.k.a. elements) of other concepts. From the set-theoretic point of view this is the way to proceed, as stated in the following quotation from the celebrated Naive Set Theory ( [15] ):
Sets, as they are usually conceived, have elements or members. An element of a set may be a wolf, a grape, or a pidgeon. It is important to know that a set itself may also be an element of some other set. [...] What may be surprising is not so much that sets may occur as elements, but that for mathematical purposes no other elements need ever be considered.
P. HALMOS Also in the Description Logic arena the idea of enhancing the language of description logics with statements of the form C ∈ D, with C and D concepts is not: assertions of the form D(A), with A a concept name, are allowed in OWL-Full [26] . Here, we do not consider roles, i.e. relations among individuals (also called properties in OWL), as possible instances of concepts. However, we would like to push the usage of membership a little forward, allowing not only the possibility of stating that an arbitrary concept C can be thought as an instance of another one (C ∈ D), or even as an instance of itself (C ∈ C), but also opening to the possibility of talking about all possible sub-concepts of C, that is adding memberships to the power-set Pow(C) of C.
In order to realize our plan we introduce a DL, to be dubbed ALC Ω , whose two parents are ALC and a rudimentary (finitely axiomatized) set theory Ω.
Considering an example taken from [28, 22] , using membership axioms, we can represent the fact that eagles are in the red list of endangered species, by the axiom Eagle ∈ RedListSpecies and that Harry is an eagle, by the assertion Eagle(harry). We could further consider a concept notModifiableList , consisting of those lists that cannot be modified (if not by, say, a specifically enforced law) and, for example, it would be reasonable to ask RedListSpecies ∈ notModifiable List but, more interestingly, we would also clearly want notModifiableList ∈ notModifiableList .
The power-set concept, Pow(C), allows to capture in a natural way the interactions between concepts and metaconcepts. Considering again the example above, the statement "all instances of species in the Red List are not allowed to be hunted" can be represented by the concept inclusion axiom: RedListSpecies ⊑ Pow(CannotHunt ), meaning that all the instances in the RedListSpecies (as the class Eagle) are collections of individuals of the class CannotHunt. Notice, however, that Pow(CannotHunt) is not limited to include RedListSpecies but can include a much larger universe of sets (e.g. anything belonging to Pow(Humans)).
Motik has shown in [22] that the semantics of metamodeling adopted in OWL-Full leads to undecidability already for ALC-Full, due to the free mixing of logical and metalogical symbols. In [22] , limiting this free mixing but allowing atomic names to be interpreted as concepts and to occur as instances of other concepts, two alternative semantics (the Contextual π-semantics and the Hilog ν-semantics) are proposed for metamodeling. Decidability of SHOIQ extended with metamodeling is proved under either of the two proposed semantics.
Starting from [22] , many approaches to metamodeling have been proposed in the literature including membership among concepts. Most of them [9, 17, 20, 14] are based on a Hilog semantics, while [25, 23] define extensions of OWL DL and of SHIQ (respectively), based on semantics interpreting concepts as well-founded sets. None of these proposals includes the power-set concept in the language.
Here, we propose an extension of ALC with power-set concepts and membership axioms among concepts, whose semantics is naturally defined using sets (not necessarily well-founded) living in Ω-models. We first prove that ALC Ω is decidable by defining, for any ALC Ω knowledge base K, a polynomial translation K T into ALCOI, exploiting a technique-originally proposed and studied in [8] -consisting in identifying the membership relation ∈ with the accessibility relation of a normal modality. Such an identification naturally leads to a correspondence between the power-set operator and the modal necessity operator ✷, a correspondence used here to translate ∀R.C-type concepts. We show that the translation K T enjoys the finite model property and exploit it in the proof of completeness of the translation. From the translation in ALCOI we also get an EXPTIME upper bound on the complexity of concept satisfiability in ALC Ω . Interestingly enough, our translation has strong relations with the first-order reductions in [13, 17, 20] .
We further exploit the correspondence between ∈ and the accessibility relation of a normal modality in another direction, to provide a polynomial set-theoretic translation of ALC Ω in the set theory Ω. Our aim is to understand the real nature of the power-set concept in ALC Ω , as well as showing that a description logic with just the power-set concept, but no roles and no individual names, is as expressive as ALC Ω .
We proceed step by step by first defining a set-theoretic translation of ALC based on Schild's correspondence result [27] and on the set-theoretic translation for normal polymodal logics in [8] . Then, we consider the fragment of ALC Ω containing union, intersection, (set-)difference, complement, and power-set (but neither roles nor named individuals) and we show that this fragment, that we call LC Ω , has an immediate settheoretic translation into Ω, where the power-set concept is translated as the power-set in Ω. Finally, we provide an encoding of the whole ALC Ω into LC Ω . This encoding shows that LC Ω is as expressive as ALC Ω and also provides, as a by-product, a settheoretic translation of ALC Ω where the membership relation ∈ is used to capture both the roles R i and the membership relation in ALC Ω . The full path leads to a set-theoretic translation of both the universal restriction and power-set concept of ALC Ω in the theory Ω using the single relational symbol ∈.
The outline of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we recall the definition of the description logics ALC and ALCOI, and of the set theory Ω. In Section 3, we introduce the logic ALC Ω . In Section 4, we provide a translation of the logic ALC Ω into the description logic ALCOI. In Section 5, we develop set-theoretic translations for ALC and LC Ω and an encoding of ALC Ω into LC Ω . Sections 6 describes related work and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

The description logics ALC and ALCOI
Let N C be a set of concept names, N R a set of role names and N I a set of individual names. The set C of ALC concepts can be defined inductively as follows:
-A ∈ N C , ⊤ and ⊥ are concepts in C;
A knowledge base (KB) K is a pair (T , A), where T is a TBox and A is an ABox. The TBox T is a set of concept inclusions (or subsumptions) C ⊑ D, where C, D are concepts in C. The ABox A is a set of assertions of the form C(a) and R(a, b) where C is a concept, R ∈ N R , and a, b ∈ N I .
An interpretation for ALC (see [2] ) is a pair I = ∆, · I where: ∆ is a domaina set whose elements are denoted by x, y, z, . . . -and · I is an extension function that maps each concept name C ∈ N C to a set C I ⊆ ∆, each role name R ∈ N R to a binary relation R I ⊆ ∆ × ∆, and each individual name a ∈ N I to an element a I ∈ ∆.
It is extended to complex concepts as follows:
The notion of satisfiability of a KB in an interpretation is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Satisfiability and entailment). Given an ALC interpretation I = ∆,
Letting a query F be either an inclusion C ⊑ D (where C and D are concepts) or an assertion C(a), F is entailed by K, written K |= F , if for all models I = ∆,
Given a knowledge base K, the subsumption problem is the problem of deciding whether an inclusion C ⊑ D is entailed by K. The instance checking problem is the problem of deciding whether an assertion C(a) is entailed by K. The concept satisfiability problem is the problem of deciding, for a concept C, whether C is consistent with K (i.e., whether there exists a model I of K, such that C I = ∅). In the following we will also consider the description logic ALCOI allowing inverse roles and nominals. For a role R ∈ N R , its inverse is a role, denoted by R − , which can be used in existential and universal restrictions with the following semantics: (x, y) ∈ (R − ) I if and only if (y, x) ∈ R I . For a named individual a ∈ N I , the nominal {a} is the concept such that: ({a}) I = {a I }.
The theory Ω
The first-order theory Ω consists of the following four (simple) axioms, written in the language whose relational symbols are ∈ and ⊆, and whose functional symbols are ∪, \, Pow :
In any Ω-model everything is supposed to be a set. Hence, a set will have (only) sets as its elements and circular definitions of sets are not forbidden-i.e., for example, there are models of Ω in which there are sets admitting themselves as elements. Moreover, not postulating in Ω any link between membership ∈ and equality-in axiomatic terms, having no extensionality (axiom)-, there exist Ω-models in which there are different sets with equal collection of elements.
The most natural Ω-model-in which different sets are, in fact, always extensionally different-is the collection of well-founded sets HF = HF 0 = n∈N HF n , where:
In HF 0 every system of set-theoretic equations of the form:
where x i,j is one among x 1 , . . . , x i−1 for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , m i , finds a unique solution. If we drop the index-ordering restriction on variables appearing in the right-hand-side of set-theoretic equations (thereby allowing equations such as x = {x}), in order to guarantee the existence of solutions in the model we need to work with universes larger than HF. The most natural (and minimal) among them is a close relative of HF 0 and goes under the name of HF 1/2 (see [1, 24] ). Finally, a further enrichment of both HF 0 and HF 1/2 is obtained by adding atoms, that is copies of the empty-set, to be denoted by a 1 , a 2 , . . . and collectively represented by A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . .}. The resulting universes will be denoted by HF 0 (A) and
A complete discussion relative to universes of sets to be used as models of Ω goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is convenient to point out that, in all cases of interest for us here, an especially simple view of Ω-models can be given using finite graphs. Actually, HF 0 or HF 1/2 can be seen as the collection of finite graphs (either acyclic or cyclic, respectively), where sets are represented by nodes and arcs depict the membership relation among sets (see [24] ). Given one such membership graph G it is convenient to single out a special node (the point of the graph), to isolate the specific set for which the description is introduced.
In the next section, we will regard the domain ∆ of a DL interpretation as a transitive set in a universe of an Ω-model, i.e. ∆ will be a set of sets in (a universe of a model of) the theory Ω rather than as a set of individuals, as customary in description logics.
The description logic ALC
Ω
We start from the observation that in ALC concepts are interpreted as sets (namely, sets of domain elements) and we generalize ALC by allowing concepts to be interpreted as sets of the set theory Ω. In addition, we extend the language of ALC by introducing the power-set as a new concept constructor, and allowing membership relations among concepts in the knowledge base. We call ALC Ω the resulting extension of ALC. As before, let N I , N C , and N R be the set of individual names, concept names, and role names in the language, respectively. In building complex concepts, in addition to the constructs of ALC, we also consider the difference \ and the power-set Pow constructs. The set of ALC Ω concepts are defined inductively as follows: -A ∈ N C , ⊤ and ⊥ are ALC Ω concepts; -if C, D are ALC Ω concepts and R ∈ N R , then the following are ALC Ω concepts:
While the concept C\D can be easily defined as C ⊓¬D in ALC, this is not the case for the concept Pow(C). Informally, the instances of concept Pow(C) are all the subsets of the instances of concept C, which are "visible" in (i.e. which belong to) ∆. Besides usual assertions of the forms C(a) and R(a, b) with a, b ∈ N I , ALC Ω allows in the ABox concept membership axioms and role membership axioms of the forms C ∈ D and (C, D) ∈ R, respectively, where C and D are ALC Ω concepts and R is a role name.
Considering again the example from the Introduction, the additional expressivity of the language, in which general concepts (and not only concept names) can be instances of other concepts, allows for instance to represent the fact that polar bears are in the red list of endangered species, by the axiom Polar ⊓ Bear ∈ RedListSpecies. We can further represent the fact the polar bears are more endangered than eagles by adding a role moreEndangered and the role membership axiom (Polar ⊓ Bear , Eagle) ∈ moreEndangered . The inclusion RedListSpecies ⊑ Pow(CannotHunt ) means that any element of RedListSpecies (such as Polar ⊓ Bear ) is a subset of CannotHunt, i.e., each polar bear cannot be hunted. As shown in [22] , the meaning of the sentence "all the instances of species in the Red List are not allowed to be hunted" could be captured by combining the ν-semantics with SWRL [18] , but not by the ν-semantics alone.
We define a semantics for ALC Ω by extending the ALC semantics in Section 2.1 to capture the meaning of concepts (including concept Pow(C)) as elements (sets) of the domain ∆, chosen as a transitive set (i.e. a set x satisfying (∀y ∈ x)(y ⊆ x)) in a model of Ω. Roles are interpreted as binary relations over the domain ∆. Individual names are interpreted as elements of a set of atoms A from which the sets in ∆ are built.
Definition 2. An interpretation for ALC
Ω is a pair I = ∆, · I over a set of atoms A where:
-the non-empty domain ∆ is a transitive set chosen in the universe U of a model M of Ω over the atoms in A;
3
-the extension function · I maps each concept name A ∈ N C to an element A I ∈ ∆; each role name R ∈ N R to a binary relation R I ⊆ ∆ × ∆; and each individual name a ∈ N I to an element a I ∈ A ⊆ ∆.
The function · I is extended to complex concepts of ALC Ω , as in Section 2.1 for ALC, but for the two additional cases: (Pow(C))
Observe that A ⊆ ∆ ∈ U. As ∆ is not guaranteed to be closed under union, intersection, etc., the interpretation C I of a concept C is a set in U but not necessarily an element of ∆. However, given the interpretation of the power-set concept as the portion of the (set-theoretic) power-set visible in ∆, it easy to see by induction that, for each C, the extension of C I is a subset of ∆. Given an interpretation I, the satisfiability of inclusions and assertions is defined as in ALC interpretations (Definition 1). Satisfiability of (concept and role) membership axioms in an interpretation I is defined as follows:
3 In the following, for readability, we will denote by ∈, Pow , ∪, \ (rather than Pow M , ∪ M , \ M ) the interpretation in a model M of the predicate and function symbols ∈, Pow , ∪, \.
. With this addition, the notions of satisfiability of a KB and of entailment in ALC Ω (denoted |= ALC Ω ) can be defined as in Section 2.1.
The problem of instance checking in ALC Ω includes both the problem of verifying whether an assertion C(a) is a logical consequence of the KB and the problem of verifying whether a membership C ∈ D is a logical consequence of the KB (i.e., whether C is an instance of D).
In the next section, we define a polynomial encoding of the language ALC Ω into the description logic ALCOI.
Translation of ALC
Ω into ALCOI
To provide a proof method for ALC Ω , we define a translation of ALC Ω into the description logic ALCOI, including inverse roles and nominals. In [8] the membership relation ∈ is used to represent a normal modality R of a modal logic. In this section, vice-versa, we exploit the correspondence between ∈ and the accessibility relation of a modality, by introducing a new (reserved) role e in N R to represent the inverse of the membership relation: in any interpretation I, (x, y) ∈ e I will stand for y ∈ x. The idea underlying the translation is that each element u of the domain ∆ in an ALCOI interpretation I = ∆, · I can be regarded as the set of all the elements v such that
The translation of a knowledge base K = (T , A) of ALC Ω into ALCOI can be defined as follows. First, we associate each concept C of ALC Ω to a concept C T of ALCOI by replacing all occurrences of the power-set constructor Pow with a concept involving the universal restriction ∀e (see below). More formally, we (inductively) define the translation C T of C by simply recursively replacing every subconcept Pow(D) appearing in C by ∀e.D
T , while the translation T commutes with concept constructors in all other cases.
Semantically this will result in interpreting any (sub)concept (Pow(D)) I by
which, recalling that (x, y) ∈ e I stands for y ∈ x, will characterise the collection of subsets of D I visible in ∆ (i.e. subsets of D I which are also elements of ∆):
Translating TBox, ABox, and queries
We define a new TBox, T T , by introducing, for each inclusion
Additionally, for each (complex) concept C occurring in the knowledge base K (or in the query) on the l.h.s. of a membership axiom C ∈ D or (C, D) ∈ R, we extend N I with a new individual name 4 e C and we add the concept equivalence:
in T T . From now on, new individual names such as e C will be called concept individual names. This equivalence is intended to capture the property that, in all the models I = ∆,
C is in relation e I with all and only the instances of concept C T , i.e., for all y ∈ ∆, (e I C , y) ∈ e I if and only if y ∈ (C T ) I . As in the case of the power-set constructor, this fact can be verified by analyzing the semantics of ∃e − .{e C }:
which, recalling that e stands for ∋ and interpreting the nominal, will stand for
which, by the concept equivalence C T ≡ ∃e − .{e C }, is as to say that e I C and (C T )
I have the same extension.
Remark 1.
It is important to notice that every concept individual name of the sort e C introduced above-that is, every individual name whose purpose is that of providing a name to the extension of C I -, in general turns out to be in relation e with other elements of the domain ∆ of I (unless C is an inconsistent concept and its extension is empty). This is in contrast with the assumption relative to other "standard" individual names a ∈ N I , for which we will require (¬∃e.⊤)(a) (see below).
We define A T as the set of assertions containing:
, -for each assertion R(a, b) in A, the assertion R(a, b) and, finally, -for each (standard) individual name a ∈ N I , the assertion (¬∃e.⊤)(a). As noticed above, the last requirement forces all named individuals (in the language of the initial knowledge base K) to be interpreted as domain elements which are not in relation e with any other element.
Let
be the knowledge base obtained by translating K into ALCOI.
Example 1. Let K = (T , A) be the knowledge base considered above: T = {RedListSpecies ⊑ Pow(CannotHunt )} and A = {Eagle(harry), Eagle ∈ RedListSpecies, Polar ⊓ Bear ∈ RedListSpecies}. By the translation above, we obtain: Let F be a query of the form C ⊑ D, C(a) or C ∈ D We assume that all the individual names, concept names and role names occurring in F also occur in K and we define a translation F T of the query F as follows:
In the following we state the soundness and completeness of the translation of an ALC Ω knowledge base into ALCOI.
Proposition 1 (Soundness of the translation). The translation of an ALC
Ω knowl- edge base K = (T , A) into ALCOI is sound,
that is, for any query F :
Proof. By contraposition, assume K |= ALC Ω F and let I = ∆, · I be a model of K in ALC Ω that falsifies F . Let ∆ be the transitive set living in a model of Ω with universe
′ , which is going to be a model of
The interpretation I ′ is well defined. First, the interpretation B
I
′ of a named concept B is a subset of ∆ ′ as expected. In fact, as ∆ ′ = ∆ and ∆ is a transitive set, each x ∈ B I ∈ ∆ is an element (a set) x ∈ ∆, and hence an element in ∆ ′ . Also, each element a I ∈ A belongs to ∆ and hence to ∆ ′ . It is easy to see that the interpretation of constant e C is an element C I ∈ ∆ ′ . In fact, as the named individual e C has been added by the translation to the language of K T , there must be some membership axiom C ∈ D (or (C, D) ∈ R) in K, for some D (respectively, for some D and R). Considering the case that axiom C ∈ D is in K, as I is a model of K, I satisfies C ∈ D, so that C I ∈ D I must hold. However, as D I ⊆ ∆, it must be C I ∈ ∆. Hence, by construction, e
We can prove by induction on the structural complexity of the concepts that, for all
For the base case, the property above holds for C = ⊤ and C = ⊥, as ⊤ T = ⊤ and ⊥ T = ⊥, and it also holds by construction for all concept names B ∈ N C .
For the inductive step, let C = C 1 ⊓C 2 and let x ∈ ((C 1 ⊓C 2 ) T )
′ and since by induction (2) holds for concepts C 1 and C 2 , we have x ∈ C I 1 and
I . It is easy to see that the vice-versa also holds, i.e., if
For the case
′ if and only if y ∈ x and, by inductive hypothesis,
I . The vice-versa can be proved similarly.
Let us consider the case
By inductive hypothesis, y ∈ D I . Furthermore, by construction of I ′ , it must be that (x, y) ∈ R I and x, y ∈ ∆. Hence, x ∈ (∃R.D) I . The vice-versa can be proved similarly as well as all the other cases for the concept C.
Using (2) we can now check that all axioms and assertions in
Each assertion D T (a) ∈ A T , is obtained from the translation of the assertion D(a) ∈ A. From the fact that D(a) is satisfied by I, i.e. a I ∈ D I , given property (2), it follows that a
For each assertion D T (e C ) ∈ A T obtained from the translation of a membership axiom C ∈ D, from the fact that I is a model of K, we know that C I ∈ D I holds. By construction, e I ′ C = C I and we have seen that
follows that e I ′ C ∈ D I and, by property (2), e
For each assertion R(e C , e D ) ∈ A T obtained from the translation of a role membership axiom (C, D) ∈ R, from the fact that I is a model of K, we know that
For each assertion (¬∃e.⊤)(a), for a ∈ N I , it is easy to see that a
I ∈ A and an element of A in ∆ is interpreted as an empty set, there is no y such that y ∈ a I . Hence, by definition of e
We still need to show that axiom C T ≡ ∃e − .{e C } is satisfied in I ′ for all the concepts C occurring in K on the l.h.s. of membership axioms. Let x ∈ (C T ) I ′ . By property (2), x ∈ C I and, by construction, e
We want to show that x ∈ (∃e − .{e C }) Proof. We prove this result by providing an alternative (but equivalent) translation
, using a single negated role ¬e. ALC(¬) extends ALC with role complement operator, where, for any role R, the role ¬R is the negation of role R, where (x, y) ∈ (¬R) I if and only if (x, y) ∈ R I . In the translation, we exploit ¬e to capture non-membership, where (x, y) ∈ (¬e) I if and only if (x, y) ∈ e I (i.e., in set terms, y ∈ x). Decidability of concept satisfiability in ALC(¬) has been proved by Lutz and Sattler in [21] . The finite model property of a language with a single negated role ¬e can be proved as done in [10] (Section 2) for a logic with the "window modality", by standard filtration, extended to deal with additional K-modalities (for the other roles) as in the proof in [3] . Indeed, as observed in [21] , the "window operator" studied in [10] is strongly related to a negated modality, as φ can be written as [¬R]¬φ.
The translation K T (¬) can be defined modifying K T by replacing the concept equivalence C T ≡ ∃e − .{e C } with the assertions: (∀e.C T )(e C ) and (∀(¬e).(¬C T ))(e C ). One can show that from any model I = (∆,
we can easily define a model of K T in ALCOI, and vice-versa-considering the usual interpretation of negated roles, inverse roles and nominals. In fact, the semantics of the assertion (∀e.C T )(e C ) is the following:
which is equivalent to ∃e − .{e C } ⊑ C T . The semantics of the assertion (∀(¬e).(¬C T ))(e C ) is: for all x ∈ ∆, (e To conclude our analysis we now prove the completeness of the translation K T of a knowledge base K in ALCOI.
Proposition 3 (Completeness of the translation). The translation of an ALC
Ω knowledge base K = (T , A) into ALCOI is complete, that is, for any query F :
Proof. We prove the completeness of the translation by contraposition. Let
Then there is a model I = ∆, · I of K T in ALCOI such that I falsifies F . We show that we can build a model J = Λ, · J of K in ALC Ω , where the domain Λ is a transitive set in the universe HF 1/2 (A) consisting of all the hereditarily finite rational hypersets built from atoms in A = {a 0 , a 1 , . . .}.
We define Λ starting from the graph 6 G = ∆, e I , whose nodes are the elements of ∆ and whose arcs are the pairs (x, y) ∈ e I . Notice that, by Proposition 2, the graph G can be assumed to be finite. Intuitively, an arc from x to y in G stands for the fact that y ∈ x.
At this point, let ∆ 0 = {d 1 , . . . , d m } be the elements of ∆ which, in the model
Observe that, for the concepts C occurring on the l.h.s. of membership axioms, as ax-
The above definition uniquely determines hypersets in HF 1/2 (A). This follows from the fact that all finite systems of (finite) set-theoretic equations have a solution in HF 1/2 (A). As a matter of fact, whenever the graph G is acyclic (which, however, may not be the case here), the definition of M (d) identifies a standard (recursively given) hereditarily finite set 7 . Our task now is to complete the definition of J = Λ, · J in such a way to prove that J is a model of K in ALC Ω falsifying F . The definition is completed as follows:
We can now prove, by induction on the structural complexity of concepts, that the following holds, for all x ∈ ∆:
The base case for concept names, ⊤, and ⊥ is trivial, as ⊤ T = ⊤, and ⊥ T = ⊥.
6 Strictly speaking the graph G introduced here is not really necessary: it is just mentioned to single out the membership relation ∈ from e I more clearly. 7 More generally, when e I is a well-founded relation, M (·) is a set-theoretic "rendering" of e I : the so-called Mostowski collapse of e I (see [19] ).
The vice-versa is proved similarly.
The cases in which C = (∃R.D) or C = (∀R.D), are also straightforward. We only consider the case
For the case C = Pow(D), by definition of translation, we have that:
which is as to say that M (x) ⊆ D J . All the elements of M (x) are of the form M (y) for some y ∈ ∆, therefore we have that:
which, by definition of M (·) and by inductive hypothesis, means that: 
As the assertion R(e C , e D ) is in K T and is satisfied in I, we have (e We define a set-theoretic translation of ALC Ω in the set theory Ω, exploiting the correspondence between ∈ and the accessibility relation of a normal modality studied in [8] . In Section 5.1, we define a set-theoretic translation of ALC, based on the translation introduced by D'Agostino et al. for normal, complete finitely axiomatizable polymodal logics [8] . Here, according to the well known correspondence between description logics and modal logics studied by Schild [27] , concepts (sets of elements) play the role of propositions (sets of worlds) in the polymodal logic, while universal and existential restrictions ∀R and ∃R play the role of universal and existential modalities ✷ i and ✸ i .
In Section 5.2 we focus on the fragment of ALC Ω admitting no roles, no individual names and no existential and universal restrictions, that we call LC Ω . We show that LC Ω can be given a simple set-theoretic translation in Ω. Finally, in Section 5.3, we see that this set-theoretic translation can be naturally extended to the full ALC Ω . In particular, we encode ALC Ω into its fragment LC Ω , showing that LC Ω is as expressive as ALC Ω and providing a set-theoretic translation of ALC Ω in which ∀R i .C and the power-set concept Pow(C) are encoded in a uniform way.
A set theoretic translation of ALC with empty ABox
Let R 1 , . . . , R k be the roles occurring in the knowledge base K = (T , A) and let A 1 , . . . , A n be the concept names occurring in K. Given a concept C of ALC, built from the concept names and role names in K, its set-theoretic translation is a settheoretic term C S (x, y 1 , . . . , y k , x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x, y 1 , . . . , y k , x 1 , . . . , x n are settheoretic variables, inductively defined as follows:
(∃R i .C) S is translated to the set-theoretic term (¬∀R i .¬C) S . Each ALC concept C is represented by a set-theoretic term C S and interpreted as a set in each model of Ω. Membership is used to give an interpretation of roles, as for modalities in the polymodal logics in [8] .
For a single role R, by imitating the relation R I with ∈ (where v ∈ u corresponds to (u, v) ∈ R I ), we naturally obtain that Pow(C) corresponds to the universal restriction ∀R.C. For multiple roles, in order to encode the different relations R 1 , . . . , R k , k sets U i are considered. Informally, each set U i (represented by the variable y i ) is such that (v, v ′ ) ∈ R I i iff there is some u i ∈ U i such that u i ∈ v and v ′ ∈ u i . Given an ALC knowledge base K = (T , A) with A = ∅, we define the translation of the TBox axioms as follows:
We can then establish a correspondence between subsumption in ALC Ω and derivability in the set theory Ω, instantiating the result of Theorem 5 in [8] as follows:
Proposition 5. For all concepts C and D on the language of the theory K:
where T rans 2 (x) stands for ∀y∀z(y ∈ z∧z ∈ x → y ⊆ x), that is, x ⊆ Pow(Pow(x)).
The validity of T rans 2 (x) on the set x, which here represents the domain ∆ of an ALC Ω interpretation (a transitive set), is required, as in the polymodal case in [8] , to guarantee that elements accessible through R i turn out to be themselves in x. The set Axiom H (x, y 1 , . . . , y k ), which in [8] contains the translation of the specific axioms of a polymodal logic, here is empty, as in ALC Ω roles do not have any specific additional properties, and they correspond to the modalities of the normal polymodal logic K m .
Roughly speaking, the meaning of Proposition 5 is that, for all instances of x representing the domain ∆ and for all the instances U 1 , . . . , U k of the set variables y 1 , . . . , y k , any choice for the interpretation x 1 , . . . , x n of the atomic concepts A 1 , . . . , A n in K which satisfies the TBox axioms over the elements in x (i.e., over the domain ∆), also satisfies the inclusion C S ⊆ D S over ∆. From the correspondence of the logic ALC with the normal polymodal logic K m in [27] and from the soundness and completeness of the set-theoretic translation for normal polymodal logics (Theorems 17 and 18 in [8] ), we can conclude that, for ALC, the set-theoretic translation above is sound and complete.
This set-theoretic translation can then be extended to more expressive description logics adding in Axiom H (x, y) the set-theoretic encoding of the semantic properties of the DL constructs. In the following, we consider few examples and we let for future work the development of a set-theoretic characterizations for more expressive DLs.
Role hierarchy axioms have the form R j ⊑ R i , and semantic condition R I j ⊆ R I i . They can be captured by adding in Axiom H (x, y 1 , . . . , y k ) the condition y j ⊆ y i .
Transitivity of a role R i , T rans(R i ), which corresponds to the role inclusion axiom R i • R i ⊑ R i , can be captured adding the following axiom in Axiom H (x, y 1 , . . . , y k ):
Similarly for complex role inclusions and inverse roles. A direct translation of nominals, {a}, would require a set theory with singleton operators.
A set-theoretic translation of the fragment LC
Ω
In this section we focus on the fragment LC Ω of ALC Ω without roles, individual names, universal and existential restrictions and role assertions, and we show that it can be given a simple set-theoretic translation in the set theory Ω. This translation provides some insight in the nature of the power-set construct in ALC Ω . Let us consider a fragment of ALC Ω which does neither allow existential and universal restrictions nor role assertions. We call LC Ω such a fragment, whose concepts are defined inductively as follows:
-A ∈ N C , ⊤ and ⊥ are LC Ω concepts;
-if C, D are LC Ω concepts, then the following are LC Ω concepts:
The semantics of concept constructs in LC Ω is the same as in ALC Ω . An LC Ω knowledge base K is a pair (T , A) , where the TBox T is a set of concept inclusions C ⊑ D, and the ABox A is a set of membership axioms C ∈ D. The notions of satisfiability of a knowledge base K and entailment form K are defined as in ALC Ω .
Given an LC Ω knowledge base K = (T , A), let A 1 , . . . , A n be the concept names occurring in K. We define a translation of an LC Ω concept C over the language of K to a set-theoretic term C S (x, x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x, x 1 , . . . , x n are set-theoretic variables, by induction on the structure of concepts, as follows:
Let K = (T , A). The translation for the TBox T and ABox A is defined as follows:
We can now establish a correspondence between subsumption in LC Ω and derivability in the set theory Ω. 
where T rans(x) stands for ∀y(y ∈ x → y ⊆ x), that is, x ⊆ Pow(x), and Axiom H (x, y 1 , . . . , y k ) has been omitted as it is empty.
Proof. (⇒) For the completeness, we proceed by contraposition. Suppose there is a model M of Ω, with universe U over A, which falsifies the formula:
We define an ALC Ω interpretation I = (∆, · I ), as follows: -∆ = u; -A I i = v i , for i = 1, . . . , n (i.e.,A i occurs in K); A I = ∅ for all other A ∈ N C . I is well-defined. By construction, ∆ is a transitive set living in the universe U of the
We can prove by structural induction that, for all the concepts C built from the concept names in K, for the variable substitution β = [u/x, v/x], and for all w ∈ ∆:
The proof is by induction on the structure of the concept C. We consider the two interesting cases of named concepts and the power-set concept. 
The equivalence (5) can be used to prove that the ALC Ω interpretation I is a model of K, i.e. it satisfies all axiom inclusions and membership inclusions in K, and that I falsifies the inclusion C ⊑ D. From this, it follows that, K |= ALC Ω C ⊑ D. We prove that I is a model of K.
For inclusion axioms, let C ⊑ D in K, we show that, for all w ∈ ∆, if w ∈ C We show that M falsifies the formula:
Let β be the variable substitution β = [u/x, v/x], where: u = ∆ and v j = A I j ∈ ∆, for all j = 1, . . . , n. We can prove that, for all the concepts C built from the concept names in K, and for all w ∈ ∆:
The proof is by induction on the structure of the concept C. Let w ∈ ∆. We consider the two cases of named concepts and the power-set concept.
, by the translation of the power-set Property (7) can be used to prove that the formula (6) is falsified in the model M of Ω. It is enough to prove that:
and, again by (7),
In a similar way we can show that the inclusion (
A similar correspondence result can be proved for instance checking, by replacing the inclusion C S ∩ x ⊆ D S in Proposition 7 with C S ∈ D S ∩ x. As we can see from the translation above, the power-set construct in LC Ω is defined precisely as the set-theoretic power-set. The same is in ALC Ω . From the translation it is clear that only the part of the power-set which is in x (the domain ∆) is relevant when evaluating the axioms in K or in a query. In particular, the axioms in the knowledge base are only required to be satisfied over the elements of the transitive set x. Notice that it is the same in the set-theoretic translation of ALC: the knowledge base axioms are required to be satisfied on the elements in x.
Observe also that, in both the translations of ALC and of LC Ω , ⊤ is interpreted as the transitive set x. It would not be correct to interpret ⊤ as the universe U of a model of Ω, as U might not be a set. Furthermore, Pow(⊤) is in the language of concepts and the interpretation of Pow(⊤) must be larger than the interpretation of ⊤.
Translating ALC
Ω by encoding into LC
Ω
In this section we show that LC Ω has the same expressive power as ALC Ω , as universal and existential restrictions of the language ALC Ω (as well as role assertions) can be encoded into LC Ω . This encoding, together with the set-theoretic translation of LC Ω given in the previous section, determines a set-theoretic translation for ALC Ω , in which both the roles and the power-set construct are translated in a similar fashion, according to the polymodal translation in [8] .
Given an ALC Ω knowledge base K = (T , A), let R 1 , . . . , R k be the role names occurring in K, A 1 , . . . , A n the concept names occurring in K, and a 1 , . . . , a r the individual names occurring in K. We introduce k new concept names U 1 , . . . , U k in the language, one for each role R i . These concepts (that are not in N C ) will be used to encode universal restrictions ∀R i .C as well as the power-set concept Pow(C) of
For an ALC Ω concept C, the encoding C E in LC Ω can be defined by recursively replacing: every named individual a i with the new concept name B i , every subconcept ∀R i .C with (∀R i .C) E and every subconcept Pow(C) with (Pow(C)) E , as defined below, while the encoding E commutes with concept constructors in all other cases:
The encoding of ∀R i .C is based on the same idea as the set-theoretic encoding of ∀R i .C in Section 5.1. For each (∀R i .C) E -element y we require that, for all y ′ ∈ y which are in U i , all the elements z in y ′ are C E -elements. For the power-set, for each (Pow(C)) Eelement y, we require that all its elements y ′ ∈ y, which are not U 1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ U k -elements, are C E -elements. We cannot simply define (Pow(C)) E as Pow(C E ), as it is necessary to keep the encodings of ∀R i .C and Pow(C) (both based on the set-theoretic power-set) independent of each other.
Given an ALC Ω knowledge base K, and a query F (over the language of K), we need to define the encoding K E of K, and the encoding F E of the query 8 Inclusion axioms are only required to hold on domain elements which are not Ui-elements. 9 To translate the assertion Ri(a h , aj), we need an element u of Ui such that u is an instance of a E h and a E j is an instance of u. We call such an element F i h,j . Similarly for role membership axioms Ri(C h , Cj ). A more direct encoding of role assertions would be possible in the presence of nominals (i.e., if nominals were admitted in the languages of LC Ω and ALC Ω ) as, for instance, Ri(a h , bj ) could be equivalently written as a h ∈ ∃Ri.{aj }. However, this would require moving to a set theory with singleton operators The additional axioms:
, for any C on the l.h.s of a membership in K or in the query;
are needed in K E to avoid that the concept names A i 's, B i 's and the concepts C occurring on the l.h.s. of membership axioms are elements of U j , for some j. The last one enforces the property that: for each z ∈ ∆\( 
We can show the soundness and completeness of the encoding of ALC Ω into LC Ω .
Proposition 7 (Soundness and Completeness of the encoding of ALC
The proof can be found in the Appendix. Combining the above encoding and the set-theoretic translation for LC Ω of Section 5.2, we obtain a set-theoretic translation for ALC Ω . Let R 1 , . . . , R k be the roles occurring in the knowledge base K = (T , A) (and in the query), and let A 1 , . . . , A n be the concept names occurring in K. Given a concept C of ALC Ω , built from the concept, role and individual names in K, its set-theoretic translation (C E ) S is a set-theoretic term C * (x, y 1 , . . . , y k , x 1 , . . . , x n+m ), where we let U S i = y i , and we let the variables x n+1 , . . . , x n+m to be the set-theoretic translation of the additional concept names (B j , F i h,j and G i C h ,Cj ) introduced to encode assertions. C * is defined inductively as follows:
The translation of an ALC Ω knowledge base K can be defined accordingly, exploiting the encoding E and S of the KB. In particular, let TBox * T and ABox * A be the set-theoretic translation of T and A, respectively. Observe that T rans
, for each C 1 ⊑ C 2 ∈ T and, in addition, x i ∈ (x\(y 1 ∪ . . . ∪ y k )), for each A i occurring in K and B * i ∈ (x\(y 1 ∪ . . . ∪ y k )), for each A i occurring in K, as well as the translation of role assertions.
A set-theoretic translation for ALC Ω follows from the encoding E and the settheoretic translation S for LC Ω in Section 5.2 (see Proposition 7). For subsumption, the correspondence between ALC Ω and its set-theoretic translation can be formulated as follows, where C and D are concepts in the language of the ALC Ω knowledge base K:
The second condition, can be rewritten as:
which makes more evident that this set-theoretic translation of ALC Ω is a generalization of the translations given in Section 5.1 and in Section 5.2.
When the power-set construct does not occur in the KB, and the language is restricted to the language of ALC, it corresponds to the set-theoretic translation of ALC in Section 5.1. Here, the set x\(y 1 ∪ . . . ∪ y k ) plays the role of x in ALC translation in Proposition 5. Condition T rans
T (and in the query) correspond to the inclusions C * 1 ∩ x ⊆ C * 2 )) ∈ T Box T (and in the query). Condition T rans(x) is useless (but harmless) in this case.
When there are no roles, no assertions and no universal and existential restrictions, the set-theoretic variables are useless. Let us consider the case when, in the translation above, the interpretation of y 1 , . . . , y n is the empty set. In such a case, x\(y 1 ∪ . . . ∪ y k ) = x and the the set-theoretic encoding above collapses to the set-theoretic encoding of LC Ω in Proposition 6. In particular, condition T rans 2 (x\(y 1 ∪ . . . ∪ y k )) becomes T rans 2 (x), which trivially follows from T rans(x).
Notice that the complementary problem to subsumption (the satisfiability of the concept C ⊓ ¬D in ALC Ω with respect to a general knowledge base K) corresponds to the satisfiability of a formula in the existential fragment of Ω (i.e. the satisfiability of a formula of Ω of the form ∃x, y 1 , . . . , y k , x 1 , . . . , x n+m φ, where φ does not contain quantifiers). While the decidability of this problem in Ω is not known, the decidability of subsumption in ALC Ω comes from the translation into ALCOI given in Section 4. However, that the problem of deciding the satisfiability of an existential formula of a set theory with power-set has been proved to be decidable under the extensionality and well-foundedness assumptions [6] . Moving to a set-theory with extensionality and wellfoundedness would provide the possibility of defining, through a set-theoretic translation as the one above, a variant of ALC Ω with well-founded sets. Indeed the encoding above of ALC roles by means of the membership operator (using the power-set to capture the universal restriction) would still be possible in the case with well-founded sets, as ALC has the "tree-model property". The decidability of an extension of ALC with well-founded sets would descend for free from its set-theoretic translation and from the decidability results in [6] . Further decidable existential fragments of set-theory have been studied, such as the fragment with power-set and singleton operators [5, 7] , which opens the way to the set-theoretic definition of decidable extensions with power-set of description logics more expressive than ALC.
Related work
The power-set construct allows to capture in a very natural way the interactions between concepts and metaconcepts, adding to the language of ALC the expressivity of metamodelling. The issue of metamodelling has been analysed by Motik [22] , who proved that metamodelling in ALC-Full is already undecidable due to the free mixing of logical and metalogical symbols. Two decidable semantics, a contextual π semantics and a Hilog ν-semantics, are introduced in [22] for a language extending SHOIQ with metamodelling, where concept names, role names and individual names are not disjoint. The possibility of using the same name in different contexts is introduced in OWL 1.1 and then in OWL 2 through punning 10 . As a difference, in this paper, we consider concept names, role names and individual names to be disjoint, we allow concepts (and not only concept names) to be instances of other concepts, by membership axioms, while we do not allow role names as instances.
As in [22] , DeGiacomo et al. [9] and Homola et al. [17] employ an Hilog-style semantics to define Hi(SHIQ) and T H(SROIQ), respectively. While [22] and [9] define untyped higher-order languages which, as ALC Ω , allow a concept to be an instance of itself, [17] defines a typed higher-order extension of SROIQ allowing for a hierarchy of concepts, where concept names of order t can only occur as instances of concepts of order t + 1. In T H(SROIQ) [17] there is a strict separation between concepts and roles (as in ALC Ω ) and decidability is proved by a polynomial first-order reduction into SROIQ, which generalizes the reduction in [13] to an arbitrary number of orders. The translation in [17] introduces axioms A ′ ≡ ∃instanceOf .{c A ′ }, for each atomic concept A ′ , axioms which are quite similar to our axiom (1), that we need for the concepts C occurring in the knowledge base on the left hand side of membership axioms.
In Hi(SHIQ) [9] , complex concept and role expressions can occur as instances of other concepts as in ALC Ω . A polynomial translation of Hi(SHIQ) into SHIQ is defined and a study of the complexity of higher-order query answering is provided.
Kubincova et al. in [20] propose a Hylog-style semantics, dropping the ordering requirement in [17] and allowing the instanceOf role, with a fixed interpretation, to be used in axioms as any other role. The interpretation of role instanceOf does not correspond exactly to the interpretation of e − in our translation, as we do not introduce axiom (1) for all the concept names in N C , while we introduce it for all the concepts occurring as instances in some membership axiom.
Pan and Horrocks in [25] and Motz et al. in [23] define extensions of OWL DL and of SHIQ (respectively), based on semantics interpreting concepts as well-founded sets. In particular, [23] adds to SHIQ meta-modelling axioms equating individuals to concepts, without requiring that the instances of a concept need to stay in the same layer, and develop a tableau algorithm as an extension of the one for SHIQ.
In [14] Gu introduces the language Hi(Horn-SROIQ), an extension of Horn-SROIQ which allows classes and roles to be used as individuals based on the ν-semantics [22] . ν-satisfiability and conjunctive query answering are shown to be reducible to the corresponding problems in Horn-SROIQ.
A set-theoretic approach in DLs has been adopted by Cantone et al. in [4] for determining the decidability of higher order conjunctive query answering in the description logic DL 4,× D (where concept and role variables may occur in queries), as well as for developing a tableau based procedure for dealing with several well-known ABox reasoning tasks.
Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the similarities between Description Logics and Set Theory can be exploited to introduce in DLs the new power-set construct and to allow for (possibly circular) membership relationships among arbitrary concepts. We started from the description logic ALC Ω -combining ALC with the set theory Ω-whose interpretation domains are fragments of the domains of Ω-models. ALC Ω allows membership axioms among concepts as well as the power-set construct which, up to our knowledge, has not been considered for description logics before. We show that an ALC Ω knowledge base can be polynomially translated into an ALCOI knowledge base, providing, besides decidability, an EXPTIME upper bound for satisfiability in ALC Ω . We also develop a set-theoretic translation for the description logic ALC Ω into the set theory Ω exploiting a technique, originally proposed in [8] , for translating normal modal and polymodal logics into Ω. The translation has been defined step by step, first defining a set-theoretic translation for ALC with empty ABox, then for LC Ω , the fragment of ALC Ω without role names and individual names and, finally, providing an encoding of ALC Ω into LC Ω . The paper extends the results in [11] and in [12] . The set-theoretic translation, on the one hand, sheds some light on the nature of the power-set concept (which indeed corresponds to the set theoretic power-set) and, on the other hand, shows that the fragment of LC Ω without roles and individual names is as expressive as ALC Ω . The correspondence among fragments of set-theory and description logics may open to the possibility of transferring proof methods or decidability results across the two formalisms.
The set-theoretic translation of ALC Ω can be extended to constructs of more expressive DLs, and this approach suggests a way to incorporate the power-set construct in more expressive DLs. As the proof techniques used in this paper exploit the finite model property of ALC Ω , alternative techniques will be needed to deal with more expressive DLs. Another possible direction of future investigation is the study of a variant of the semantics with well-founded sets. s,t , t) | s, t ∈ ∆ ∧ (s, t) ∈ R I i } ∪ {(s, t) | s, t ∈ ∆ ∧ t ∈ s} We define an injection π from the leaves of N , i.e. nodes without any successor, to A and, for any given d ∈ N , we define the following hyperset M (d):
The above definition uniquely determines hypersets in HF 1/2 (A). This follows from the fact that all finite systems of (finite) set-theoretic equations have a solution in HF 1/2 (A). 
We prove ( 8) by induction on the structural complexity of concepts. Let d ∈ ∆. We consider the cases of named concepts and the power-set concept.
(by the encoding for named concepts,
st for some i and s, t ∈ ∆, or M (d iff ∀t ∈ ∆ if (d, t) ∈ R i , then t ∈ C I (definition of E)
J (by the encoding E) iff d ∈ P ow((¬U i ⊔ Pow(C E )) J ) ∩ ∆ (semantics of LC Ω )
